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COMMENTS
FEDERAL PRoCEnmm - CotINTERCLAIM TO A Cot1NTERCLAIM
IlNDER THE FEDERAL Rt1LEs-With one exception the cases decided
in the federal courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
held that the plaintiff is free to plead a counterclaim in the reply,
although in every instance the counterclaim in the reply under consideration was one related to the subject matter of the counterclaim
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pleaded in the defendant's answer.1 The court in one of the earlier
cases, Warren v. Indian Re-fining Co., stated:
"If the language used in this rule means what it says, a
counterclaim wholly unrelated to the subject matter of a suit may
be set up. The question arises, who may counterclaim? Defendant says, only the defendant. Plaintiff says, either plaintiff
or defendant. That is, it is plaintiff's contention that a plaintiff
may file a counterclaim to a counterclaim. This seems to be
exactly what Rule 13(b) permits. It is worthy of note and would
seem to be quite si~ificant that Rule 13 does not use the term
'plaintiff' or 'defendant,' or 'complaint' or 'answer,' but speaks of
'pleading,' 'a pleader' and 'any opposing party'. . . .
"It would seem that the permissive counterclaim paragraph
of Rule 13 would apply as well to a counterclaim filed by plaintiff
. . . as to the allowance of the wholly unrelated counterclaim
permitted by the defendant." 2
In Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co.,3 the plaintiff
£.led a reply containing a counterclaim and, although the plaintiff's
counterclaim related to the subject matter of the counterclaim pleaded
in the answer, the defendant felt a further pleading to be desirable
and filed an amended counterclaim. The plaintiff moved to strike
out parts of the second amended and supplemental counterclaim. The
motion was overruled, the court holding:
"Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 7 . . . is plainly to
the effect that an answer to a counterclaim is the last permitted
pleading. When the plaintiff filed its reply to defendant's original
counterclaim defendant found itself in a quandary as to how to
meet the fifth and sixth defenses set up in the counterclaim in
view of Rule 7. We do not think defendant is subject to criticism
for filing an amended counterclaim, informing the court and the
plaintiff of its position on the 'fifth' and 'sixth' defense rather
than hazard the chance that the court would permit introduction
of evidence to meet the issue without a pleading. . . ."4
1 The cases decided include: Downey v. Palmer, (D.C. N.Y. 1939) 31 F. Supp. 83;
Warren v. Indian Refining Co., (D.C. Ind. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 281; Kuenzel v. Universal
Carloading & Distributing Co., (D.C. Pa. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 407; Bethlehem Fabricators,
Inc. v. John Bowen Co., (D.C. Mass. 1940) 1 F.R.D. 274; Hartford-Empire Co. v. ObearNester Glass Co., (D.C. Mo. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 564; Cornell v. Chase Brass & Copper Co.,
(D.C. N.Y. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 979; Maison de Marchands Industrielle Ltee-Industrial
Merchants, Ltd. v. New York Silicate Book Slate Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 13 F.R.D. 15.
2 (D.C. Ind. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 281 at 282.
s (D.C. Mo. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 564.
4 Id. at 565, 566.
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In an oblique way, this district court did take cognizance of the
fact that under some circumstances, at least, the defendant would wish
to reply to the counterclaim contained in the plaintiff's reply. In the
other cases, however, the main emphasis has been on the need for
settling all matters possible within the confines of a single action. The
courts have ignored the procedural chaos which could develop if "all
matters that you start litigating"5 were included in one action without suitable provision for an ascertainment of the precise nature of
these issues. Claims and counterclaims and cross-claims could be
hurled at opposing parties, with the court's sole control lying in its
ability to order separate trials. 6
In the decade and a half since the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a number of states have taken over their provisions, either in whole or in part. Arizona, Colorado, Delaware,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Utah7
have rules or statutes with substantially the same provisions as federal
rules 7(a), 13(a) and (b), and 18(a). These states present the
similar situation which allows free joinder of claims and counterclaims
while limiting the number of pleadings, thus preventing in some cases
a precise delimitation of the issues.
Two other states, Kentucky and Texas, while influenced by the
federal rules, have apparently attempted to solve the problem posed
by the above-mentioned federal provisions. Texas rule 51 (a) parallels
federal rule 18(a) in allowing the plaintiff to plead a counterclaim in
the reply, which may be either permissive or compulsory,8 but there
is no limit on the number of pleadings which may be filed by either
the plaintiff or the defendant. 9 The rules allow the filing of such
supplementary petitions and answers "as may be necessary in the
course of pleading by the parties to the suit." Thus under the Texas
Ii Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc. v. John Bowen Co., (D.C. Mass. 1940) 1 F.R.D. 274
at 275, quoting PnoCEEDINGS OF THB A.B.A. lNsnnrm ON THB FIIDERAL RULEs 247
(1938).
.
6 Rule 42(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. (1946).
7 Ariz. Code (1939) §§21-401, 21-437, 21-438, 21-507; Colo. Stat. Ann. (1935,
1941 Cum. Supp.), Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 7(a), 13(a) and (b), IB(a); Del.
Code Ann. (1953), Superior Court Rules, rules 7(a), 13(a) and (b), 18(a), Chancery
Court Rules, rules 7(a), 13(a) and (b), 18(a); Minn. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules
7.01, 13.01, 13.02, 18.01 (1952); Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §§509.010, 509.420, 509.060,
Supreme Court Rules, rule 3:16; Nev. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 7(a), 13(a) and
(b), IB(a) (1953); N.J. Rules, rules 4:7-1, 4:13-1, 4:31-1 (1953); N.M. Stat. (1941),
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 7(a), 13(a) and (b), IB(a); Utah Code Ann. (1953),
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 7(a), (13(a) and (b), 18(a).
BTex. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 97(a) and (b) (1943).
9 Id., rules 78, 83.
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procedure, while there may be free joinder of outstanding issues,
pleadings may be continued until the parties have clearly defined the
areas in controversy.
The drafters of the Kentucky rules, which became effective on
July I, 1953, noted that the federal rules allowed a counterclaim to
be included in the reply and apparently were reluctant to adopt it
in full for the Kentucky courts. Kentucky rule 7.01 permits the
usual number of pleadings, including the reply. Rule 13.01 deals
with the compulsory counterclaim, using the same phrasing as federal
rule 13(a). Kentucky rule 13.02, dealing with permissive counterclaim, states:
"A pleading, other than a reply, may state as a counterclaim
any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim."10

In rule 18.01 it is provided that the plaintiff in his complaint and
the defendant in his answer "setting forth a counterclaim may join
either as independent or as alternative claims as many claims either
legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party."11
The reply is thus excluded from the class of pleadings in which claims
may be joined.
But under these Kentucky rules, is there any reason why the
plaintiff could not plead a single compulsory counterclaim in his
reply and actually might be considered as required to do so? It is not ·
forbidden in the section covering compulsory counterclaims. Moreover, rule 8.04 states: "Averments in a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is required are admitted when not denied in the responsive
pleading. . . ."12 Rule 12.08 states: "A party waives all defenses
and objections which he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or
reply. . . ."13
It is clear that the drafters of the Kentucky rules provided against
the injection into the action of unrelated counterclaims pleaded in
the reply. A related counterclaim, however, may still be included in
the reply, a pleading to which no responsive pleading is permitted,
and where the defendant's only protection lies in the power of amend10 Ky.
11 Id.,
12 Id.,
13 Id.,

Prac. (Baldwin, 1953), Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 13.02.
rule 18.01.
rule 8.04.
rule 12.08.
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ment:1 4 and the provision for implied denial of the averments in the
reply.15 Essentially, the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure fail to
provide for a precise formulation of the areas in controversy between
the opposing parties over related counterclaims, although they do prevent the inclusion in the reply of those counterclaims not arising from
the subject matter of the defendant's counterclaim and prohibit the
joining in the reply of related counterclaims.
Pennsylvania, a state outside the group adopting the federal rules
in whole or in part, has a recent provision in its rules of civil procedure which seems to provide for the settling in one action of all
outstanding controversies between opposing parties and at the same
time to permit a precise delimitation of the areas in controversy. In
the list of allowable pleadings appears the complaint, to be followed
''by an answer thereto, a reply if the answer contains new matter or
a counterclaim, a counter-reply if the reply to a counterclaim contains
new matter. . . ."16 Under this practice the plaintiff has an opportunity to answer the defendant's counterclaim but the defendant may
file a fourth pleading, termed here a "counter-reply" in which the
new issues raised in the reply may be answered.
Thus the court rules of two states specifically permit the use of
a fourth pleading.1 7 In two recent state cases, one in Montana and
one in New York, the defendant attempted to use a fourth pleading.
The Montana court refused to permit the use of a "sur-reply" under
the code pleading procedure prevailing in that state,1 8 but the New
York court recognized it as a valid pleading.19
·
In reaching its decision the New York court considered that section 274 of the Civil Practice Act, which states, 'Where an answer
contains new matter constituting a defense by way of avoidance, the
court, in its discretion, on the defendant's application, may direct the
plaintiff to reply to the new matter . . . " 20 should be construed to
include within the term "answer" a "reply alleging a defense by way
of avoidance to a cause of action asserted in a counterclaim."21 The
court concluded that a fourth pleading properly could be ordered by
14 Id.,

rule 15.01.
11>Jd., rule 8.01.
16Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1951) tit. 12, appx., Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 1017.
17 Jt must be recalled that at common law the pleading practice permitted a fourth
pleading. Alabama, for example, still employs the sur-rejoinder.
18 Sherburne Mercantile Co. v. Bonds, 115 Mont. 464, 145 P. (2d) 827 (1944).
19 Rosner v. Globe Valve Corp., 276 App. Div. 462, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 531 (1950).
20 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) §274.
21 Rosner v. Globe Valve Corp., 276 App. Div. 462 at 463, 95 N.Y.S. (2d) 531
(1950).
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the court in spite of section 243 of the Civil Practice Act, which
provides: "An allegation of . . . new matter in a reply is to be
deemed controverted by the adverse party, by traverse or avoidance,
as the case requires."22 With this decision, New York became the
third state to recognize the propriety of a fourth pleading, excluding
of course those states following the common law procedure.
Serious consideration might be directed toward the merits of permitting a wider use of the fourth pleading. Historically, the common
law did not limit the number of pleadings employed to determine the
issues in controversy, although its joinder rules were highly restrictive.
If a "counter-reply" should be added to the list of permitted pleadings,
it might properly be limited to the answering of matter pleaded in the
reply, excluding counterclaims of every kind.
An objection to permitting a fourth pleading might be based on
the possibility of an increased number of pleadings with a resulting
burden on the courts and the parties. If the defendant were permitted
to file such a pleading, he would undoubtedly do so in many instances,
but it seems questionable if this would place a greater real burden on
the courts and parties than exists at present, when amendments to
existing pleadings are the only way of replying to new issues which
may be interpolated into the action in the third pleading. If the
parties are to be given full notice of the issues involved, as well as
of matters to be brought out at the trial, a fourth pleading is a more
efficient device than the round-about method of amending existing
pleadings or relying on an automatic denial or avoidance.
By amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to permit a
fourth pleading, the full gains of Hexibility of joinder and notice
pleading could be retained and at the same time the parties would
have an opportunity to clarify the issues in controversy through a
direct and predictable meth?d of procedure.

Elizabeth Gaspar Brown*

22 N.Y.

Civ. Prac. Act (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) §243.
,,. Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law School.-Ed.

